IEA nu om Demand 2009

Lite senaste nytt från IAEa denna gång angående beräknad efterfråge situation totalt i världen relativt olja under 2009.

Vi har talat om det tidigare och har med detta tillfälle att igen påminna om det faktum att det inte är ev sk demand destruction som kommer att vara det som definierar framtida oljemarknad utan iställer det som benämns supply destruction eller hastigheten i produktions nedställen från existerande oljefält. Det senare beräknas dessutom at accelerera i en allt högre takt kommande årtionden allt medans efterfrågan fortsätter att öka.

Det finns nu dessutom med pågående finanskris anledning att ställa sig frågan till hur stor del minskningen i efterfråge ökningen kommer att motverkas av eller helt kompenseras för av minskad tillgång orsakat av minskade investeringar i befintlig och ny produktions kapacitet.

Inför nya OPEC mötet ser det nu ut som om brenten nu lämnat nedre $40 regionen och ser nu ut at vilja eteblera sig runt eller över $50 nivån.

Demand in non-OECD countries will rise 3.9% this year and 2.9% in 2009, the IEA said, slightly slower than its forecast in its report for November. It said the predicted cuts were linked to the economic slowdown and revised data in Asian countries like Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand.

Global oil demand will increase 0.5% next year to 86.3 million barrels a day, the IEA said, but it added that this forecast assumes that the plunge in OECD economic growth will bottom out next year and recover in the second half of 2009. The International Monetary Fund has made a similar estimate.
http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/11/news/economy/iea_demand.ap/index.htm

Add to this that we have depleation from existing oil fields as follows:

"We estimate that the average production-weighted observed decline rate worldwide is currently 6.7% for fields that have passed their production peak. In our Reference Scenario, this rate increases to 8.6% in 2030. For the world as a whole, it is estimated at 9% for post-peak fields. In other words the decline in production from existing fields would have been around one-third faster had there been no capital spending on those fields once they had passed their peak. Our Reference Scenario projections imply an increase in the global average natural decline to around 10.5% per year by 2030 (almost two percentage points higher than the observed rate), as all regions experience a drop in average field size and most see a shift in production to offshore fields over the projection period. This means that total upstream investment in some countries will need to rise, in some cases significantly, just to offset this faster decline. Our Reference Scenario projections imply an increase in the global average natural decline(almost two percentage points higher than the observed rate), as all regions experience a drop in average field size and most see a shift in production to offshore fields over the projection period."

Ececutive Summary
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2008SUM.pdf

IEA press release November 12th
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/press/pressdetail.asp?PRESS_REL_ID=275

Key Graphs
http://www.iea.org/weo/key_graphs_08/WEO_2008_Key_Graphs.pdf

IEA: The projected increase in global oil output hinges on adequate and timely investment. Some 64 mb/d of additional gross capacity — the equivalent of almost six times that of Saudi Arabia today— needs to be brought on stream between 2007 and 2030.

Then the elephant in the living room: IEA:

"Saudi Arabia remains the world’s largest producer throughout the projection period, its output climbing from 10.2 mb/d in 2007 to 15.6 mb/d in 2030. ace, TOD: "There remains the secrecy of Saudi Arabia's real production capacity which may help extend the C&C production plateau. However, I am assuming that Saudi Arabia's C&C production was pushed to its maximum limit on Jul 2008 at 9.7 mbd. Future Saudi Arabia capacity additions from Khursaniyah, Shaybah and Khurais will only offset declines from other fields, rather than increase production capacity. "
www.theoildrum.com/node/4740/431482